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ABSTRACT The Iranian rial has been depreciated on average about 13 per cent per 
annum against the U.S dollar during the last four decades. This paper examines the 
long- and short-run determinants of the black market exchange rate employing the 
cointegration techniques and the annual time series data from 1960 to 2002. Consistent 
with previous studies and the monetary approach to the exchange-rate determination, it 
is found that the black market exchange rate is cointegrated with the relative consumer 
price indices in Iran and the U.S., real GDP and the relative import prices. However, in 
the short run only the rising relative prices and a meagre real GDP growth have been 
responsible for the depreciation of Iranian currency.   
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1. Introduction 
A volatile and constantly depreciating exchange rate can adversely affect a number of key 
macroeconomic variables such as private investment, GDP growth, and the demand for 
money. In fact, the black market exchange rate in Iran can be considered as a proxy 
measure of general public confidence to the performance of economy (Valadkhani, 2003). 
This market forms a very important Iranian institution that operates in specific streets of 
Tehran and other large cities and in varied shops! One set of actors in this market may be 
overseas visitors, Iranians returning from trips abroad, Iranians now resident in other 
countries and visiting family and friends, etc. who have various quantities of a most 
valuable commodity, viz. other countries' currencies. Another set of actors comprise what 
can be termed "the real buyers" of these scarce commodities. This set includes 
businesspersons involved in international trade, particularly importers, Iranians about to 
travel overseas for any purposes, e.g. business trips, the provision of medical services, 
visiting relatives resident abroad, etc. 
 However, these "real buyers" will not physically undertake transactions with 
suppliers of other currencies on the streets. This market is characterised by middlepersons 
or agents, who close the link between buyers and sellers. These agents will be typically 
unemployed or underemployed Iranians who may well be frontpersons for wealthy 
opportunistic entrepreneurs who have recognised that a government policy for the price of 
other countries' currencies is a non-market clearing price. As the difference between the 
market price and the government-determined price for these commodities increased in 
1995, a third set of actors, the police, entered the stage!  
 In both the pre- and post-revolution periods, Iran has operated a fixed exchange 
rate regime, albeit with periodic devaluations. Prior to the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the 
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official exchange rate between the rial and the US$ was approximately 70 rials per dollar. 
At that time, the gap between the official and the black market exchange rate was about 7 
rials. However, the gap between the black market and the official rate has widened through 
time. 
 It is very interesting to note that since 1989 a new source of government revenue 
originated from the sale of foreign currencies. The exchange rate was devalued by 
approximately 25 per cent over the 1989-1992 period, but in spite of such a devaluation, 
the black market for foreign currencies persisted. The government's exchange rate policy 
had the effect of making the government a beneficiary of its own policy. The gap between 
the black market and the official rates has rendered a windfall gain for both the 
government and some foreign currency dealers in the parallel market. For this reason, it is 
apparent that the substantial segment of "other revenue" in the government annual budget 
is attributable to the sale of foreign currencies by the Central Bank in the black market. 
The share of "other revenue" in the government budget increased from an average of 14 
per cent in the revolutionary and war period (1978-1988) to 36.2 per cent in the four years 
following the end of the Iraqi war (i.e. 1989-1992). It should be noted that the Central 
Bank started its direct intervention in the black market in 1988 (Valadkhani, 1997). 
 Overestimation of government revenue and/or underestimation of expenditure, 
placed the Iranian government in a critical situation during the revolutionary and war 
period (1978-1988). On average the ratio of the budget deficit to total government 
expenditure trebled in this period compared to that of the oil boom period (1973-1977). In 
1989 the budget deficit was so large as to represent an unprecedented rate of 51 per cent of 
total expenditure. This ratio was reduced to 6.7 per cent in 1993 (Nourbakhsh, 1993). It 
seems that the sale of foreign currencies by the Central Bank in the black market played a 
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major role in this achievement! 
 It should also be mentioned that the black market for foreign currencies is linked 
very closely with the government's policies. In the 1980s the government experienced a 
substantial budget deficit and, as a result, government indebtedness to the Central Bank 
increased substantially. Under these circumstances soaring inflation was inevitable. This, 
in turn, amplified the gap between the official rate and the black market exchange rate for 
foreign currencies. For example, the gap between the official and black market exchange 
rates increased from an average of 175 rials per US dollar in the early 1980s to 1400 rials 
in 1989 (Valadkhani, 1997). 
 Because of this increasing gap between the official rate and the black market rate, 
the government devalued the rial to 1750 per US dollar in an attempt to restore an 
equilibrium in the foreign exchange market and foster non-oil exports. Notwithstanding 
the fact that Iran used a multiple-exchange-rate system in the allocation of scarce hard 
currency earnings, this system was not successful. According to Farzin (1995) at one time 
during the war the number of exchange rates applicable to various categories of imports 
and exports exceeded seven. 
 The main reason for the deterioration in the value of the rial is the monetisation of 
the enormous budget deficit during and after the war. It should be mentioned that, to some 
extent, psychological and socio-political factors have also played an undeniable role. The 
growing gap between the government official and black market exchange rates directed 
scarce resources to unproductive sectors. The profitability of the trade sector, particularly 
small-scale trade such as sidewalk and small vendors, stimulated rent-seeking activities at 
the expense of goods-producing sectors. The currency devaluation policies also coerced 
economic agents, particularly the government and semi-government enterprises, into 
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having an enormous demand for money (Bahmani-Oskooee, 1996). In other words, while 
the purchasing power of the rial decreases, people, including the government and semi-
government enterprises, demand more money to cover their transactions. It is also argued 
that the income elasticity of the demand for money has decreased since the 1979 
revolution. This means "the same rate of expansion in private sector liquidity is likely to 
have more inflationary consequences after than before the revolution" (Pesaran, 1995, 
p.5). This decline in income elasticity is also a manifestation of an inefficient banking 
system. 
 Bahmani-Oskooee (1995a, p. 278) points out that in 1993 the black market 
exchange rate was 2400 rials to the US$, involving a 30-fold depreciation of the rial. In 
March 1993 the Iranian government embarked upon the exchange rate unification policy 
with consultation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The major objective of this 
recent policy was to unify the multiple exchange rate regime into a single equilibrium rate 
by the massive intervention of the Iranian Central Bank. However, this policy has not been 
successful on various grounds, viz. the lack of an appropriate government social safety net 
to support vulnerable strata, the incorrect initial exchange rate announced by the Central 
Bank, and the unsuitable timing of the unification. See Farzin (1995) for a detailed 
explanation of these reasons and the recent assessment of the foreign exchange reform in 
Iran. 
 Therefore, in late 1995 the Iranian authorities once again decided to administer, or 
implement, the existing regulations relating to the fixed exchange rate system and 
"cracked down" on the participants in the black market. The Iranian police, with powers to 
arrest both buyers and sellers, began to be active in trying to prevent transactions in this 
market. According to the Central Bank of Iran (2003) black market exchange rate was 
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approximately 8314 rials to the US$ in 2003. More recently, the Banking system buys and 
sells foreign currencies from individuals at a rate marginally below the black market rate. 
Abstracting from political and social effects associated with this black market, the 
important question in this study is to determine the economic factors, which give rise to 
the prices in the black market for foreign currencies. 
 The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 a theoretical model is 
postulated, which captures the long-run equation for the black market exchange rate using 
both the Johansen multivariate cointegration technique and the Engle-Granger 
representation theorem. Sources of the annual data employed as well as the unit-root 
results using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Kwiatskowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests are discussed in Section 3. This section also presents the 
empirical econometric results for the long- and short-run determinants of the black market 
exchange rate, as well as policy implications of the study. Section 4 provides some 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. The Model 
Bahmani-Oskooee (1995a and 1995b) has made an important empirical contribution by 
applying cointegration techniques in his econometric analysis of those factors that 
determine the black market exchange rate. According to his empirical results, not only the 
consumer price index is cointegrated with the nominal stock of money, real GDP, the 
black market exchange rate, and the world export price index (as a proxy for import 
prices), but also the black market exchange rate has a long-run relationship with the 
consumer price index, the nominal stock of money, the real GDP, and the world export 
price index. Bahmani-Oskooee's policy conclusion is that the black market exchange rate 
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cannot be stabilised unless the Iranian government seriously curbs inflation. Consistent 
with the monetary approach to the exchange-rate determination approach, this conclusion 
is also supported by Figure 1, which shows the time series data on the relative consumer 
price indices in Iran (P) and the U.S. (P*) and the black market exchange rate (BE) for the 
US dollar during the period 1960-2003. It seems that there exists a vicious cycle in which 
a high relative inflation devalues the rial and a negligibly valued rial aggravates inflation. 
There are some empirical studies which have elucidated this cycle, for example Dadkhah 
(1987) and Bahmani-Oskooee (1993). 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 The central institutional mechanism which enables this trend to continue is the 
lack of independence of the Iranian Central Bank. According to Bahmani-Oskooee the 
independence of the Central Bank is a crucial institutional reform. In his analysis of the 
black market exchange rate, Pesaran (1992) also emphasises the interaction of inflation 
and the rates of inflation in Iran’s major trading partners (measured by bilateral and 
multilateral real exchange rate indices). He shows that when Iranian prices increase more 
than do those of her trading partners, the black market exchange rate rises. Similar results 
have also obtained in the present study. Pesaran’s analysis, as does that of Bahmani-
Oskooee (1995b), points to the crucial factor of Iran's persistent inflation as one of the 
determinants of the rising price (in Iranian rials) for major international currencies. In this 
study the long-run equation for the black market exchange rate is specified as follows: 
* *
0 1 2 3ln( ) ln( / ) ln( ) ln( / )t t t t mt mt tBE P P Y P P eβ β β β= + + + +     (1) 
where BE is the black market exchange rate (the price of $US in Iranian rial); P and P* 
denote the consumer price index (1982=1) in Iran and the U.S, respectively, the Y is Iran’s 
real GDP (1982 prices); and Pm and P
*
m are the corresponding import price indices in Iran 
 7 
and the U.S (1990=1). For a concise review of the literature on black market exchange 
rates see Siddiki (2000). 
 It is important to note that this specification assumes that the impact of the nominal 
stock of money, as proposed by Bahmani-Oskooee (1995b), is captured by the consumer 
price index. It is expected that the Iranian currency can appreciate (BE declines in 
magnitude) as prices in Iran increase less than prices in the U.S, as GDP grows, and as the 
U.S import price index rises less than that of Iran. Therefore, it can be hypothesised that if 
GDP growth in Iran is negative or negligible and if price rises are higher than those in the 
U.S economy, then the price of dollar, in rials, will rise. Based on these theoretical 
postulations, it is then expected that β1>0 and both β2 and β3<0.  
In order to have a valid model for the black market exchange rate, there should be 
at least one cointegrating vector in the system. The Johansen (1991, 1995) multivariate 
cointegration technique is used in this paper to test the existence of a long-run equilibrium 
relationship among the variables specified in equation (1). A brief description of this 
technique is presented below.  
 Let us consider the following VAR of order q: 
1 1 2 2 tt q t q tt t
y A y A y A y w−− −= + +⋅⋅⋅+ +        (2) 
where yt is a k-vector of I(1) variables (e.g. in this study k=4), and wt is a vector of white 
noise residuals. Following Johansen (1991, 1995), equation (2) can also be rewritten as: 
 
1
1 1
q
t ti t it i
y y y ε
−
−− =
∆ =Π + Γ ∆ +∑        (3) 
where 
1
q
ii
A I
=
Π = −∑ , and 1
q
i jj i
A
= +
Γ = −∑  
The rank (r) of Π  determines the number of cointegrating vectors. If Π  has a 
reduced rank (i.e. r<k), then there exist k r× matrices α  and β each with rank r, where 
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αβ ′Π =  and tyβ ′ is stationary. The elements of α  represent the adjustment parameters 
and each column of β in the literature is referred to as the cointegrating vector. Thus the 
important issue is how to determine the number cointegrating vectors (or r). In this paper 
both the trace statistics and the maximum eigenvalue statistics will determine r. The trace 
statistics test the null hypothesis of r cointegrating relations against the alternative of k 
cointegrating equations. On the other hand, the maximum eigenvalue statistics test the null 
of r cointegrating vectors versus the alternative of r+1 cointegrating relations. For more 
details see Johansen (1991, 1995).  
Let us assume that: a) all the variables in equation (1) are I(1); b) the resulting 
residuals are I(0); and c) there is only one cointegrating vector in the system . According 
to Engle and Granger (1987), it can then be stated that there exists a corresponding 
error-correction mechanism (ECM) model of the following form: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 2
3
0 1 2
*
3
*
0 0
4
0 1
1
ln ln ln
ln / ln
( / )
                  
i i
i m m t
q q
t it t i
i i
q q
i t it i
i i
t
BE
P P BE ECM
P P Yγ γ γ
γ δ θ ν
− −
= =
−−
= =
−
∆ = + ∆ + ∆ +
∆ ∆+ + +
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
       (4)  
where γji are the estimated short-term coefficients; θ represents the feedback effect or 
the speed of adjustment whereby short-term dynamics converge to the long-term 
equilibrium path indicated in equation (1); δi denotes for the estimated coefficients of 
the lagged dependent variable to ensure that vt or the disturbance term is white noise; 
ECM (the estimated et) is obtained from equation (1), and ∆ indicates the first-difference 
operator.  
The general-to-specific methodology can be used to omit insignificant variables 
in equation (4) on the basis of a battery of maximum likelihood tests. In this method, 
joint zero restrictions are imposed on explanatory variables in the unrestricted (general) 
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model to obtain the most parsimonious and robust equation in the estimation process. 
 
3. Empirical Results and Policy Implications 
The sources of data for variables shown in equation (1) are Tabibian et al. (2000), the 
Central Bank (2002, 2003) and the International Monetary Fund (2004) on-line IFS 
database. An important step before using the Johansen multivariate technique is to 
determine the time series properties of the data. This is an important issue since the use 
of non-stationary data in the absence of cointegration can result in spurious regression 
results. To this end, two unit root tests, i.e the ADF test, and the Kwiatskowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test, have been adopted to examine the stationarity, or otherwise, 
of the time series data. In this paper the lowest value of the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) has been used as a guide to determine the optimal lag length in the ADF 
regression. These lags augment the ADF regression to ensure that the error term is white 
noise and free of serial correlation. In addition to the ADF test, a KPSS test has been 
performed for all the variables. Unlike the ADF test, the KPSS test has the null of 
stationarity, and the alternative indicates the existence of a unit root. 
Prior to undertaking an empirical investigation of the major long-run 
determinants of the black market exchange rate, it is essential to determine the time 
series properties of the data. In order to make robust conclusions about stationarity or 
otherwise of the data, the ADF and the KPSS tests are utilised. The empirical results of 
the ADF and KPSS tests are summarised in Table 1. According to the results of the 
ADF and KPSS tests, all the four variables of ln(BE), ln(P/P*), ln(Y) and ln(Pm/P
*
m) are 
I(1), indicating that they become stationary after first differencing.  
[Table 1 about here] 
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 Since all the variables in equation (1) are I(1), the Johansen (1991, 1995) 
multivariate cointegration technique can now be used to test the existence of a long-run 
equilibrium relationship for BE. An unrestricted intercept and a linear trend in the 
variables but not in the cointegrating vectors enter the system. The first important step in 
this test is to determine the optimal lag length (q) in equation (3). Three lag selection 
criteria of the AIC, the Final prediction error and  the sequential modified LR (likelihood 
ratio) test statistic have been employed to determine q. Based on these criteria (not 
reported here but available from the author upon request), the optimal lag length is q=2.  
Table 2 reports the results of the Johansen multivariate cointegration test on the 
black market exchange rate as formulated in equation (1). According to both the trace and 
max-eigenvalue tests there is robust evidence of one cointegrating vector at the 5 per 
cent level. It should be noted that the eigenvalue associated with the first vector (0.54) is 
considerably higher than those corresponding to the other vectors, thereby validating 
that there exists a unique cointegrating vector in the system. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Given that there is only one cointegrating vector, one can also use the Engle-
Granger two step procedure to determine the long- and short-run factors affecting the 
black market exchange rate.  Using the ordinary least square (OLS) method, the 
estimated long-term model, equation (1), is presented below.  
* *
2
ln( ) 8.24 2.52ln( / ) 0.39ln( ) 1.03ln( / )
:             (7.3)   (13.0)                  (-3.0)           (-6.5)
0.974             Residuals (ECM): I(0)
t t t t mt mtBE P P Y P P
t
R
= + − −
=
   (5) 
There are 43 annual observations in the sample period (1960-2002). As seen from the 
above model, all the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at least at the 1 
per cent level, and have the expected theoretical signs. This equation also performs 
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extremely well in terms of goodness-of-fit statistics. The adjusted R2 is as high as 0.974 
and the overall F test rejects the null hypothesis at the one per cent level. Based on these 
results, one can argue that in the long-term, one per cent increase in relative prices 
(P/P*) can result in more than 2.5 per cent depreciation of the Iranian currency. In terms 
of the magnitude of the estimated GDP elasticity, the above results indicate that if real 
GDP increases say by 10 per cent, BE will appreciate by 3.9 per cent. It is also found 
that an increase in the relative import prices by 1 per cent, ceteris paribus, could 
strengthen the value of Iranian rial in the long-run by almost the same magnitude.  
Since the estimated residuals from the long-term model are I(0), one can use the 
Engle and Granger representation theorem (1987) to estimate the short-term model, or 
equation (4). Table 3 presents the results for the vector error correction model, which 
captures the short-term dynamics of the black market exchange rate. The general-to-
specific methodology have been adopted in estimating equation (4) by omitting 
insignificant lagged variables and undertaking a battery of maximum likelihood tests. 
Joint zero restrictions have been imposed on insignificant explanatory variables in the 
unrestricted (or general model) to obtain the most parsimonious and robust equation in 
the estimation process. The parsimonious short-term model of exchange rate includes all 
of the long-term determinants of the black market exchange rate except for ln(Pm/P
*
m) or 
the relative import price indices. 
In other words, the results reported in Table 3 indicate that the short-term 
sources of the continuous depreciation of Iranian rial are massive domestic price rises in 
Iran (compared to low rates of inflation in U.S) and the meager real growth of GDP. All 
the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at least at the 8 per cent level and 
have the expected signs. In terms of goodness-of-fit statistics, though expressed in 
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∆ln(BE), with an R2 of 0.37, this equation performs reasonably well. This equation also 
passes each and every diagnostic test. Table 3 also reveals that the feed-back coefficient 
(or adjustment speed) is as high as –0.20 meaning that in every year 20 per cent of the 
divergence between the short-term black market exchange-rate from its long-term path 
is eliminated.  
[Table 3 about here] 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper the short-term and the long-term drivers of the black market exchange rate 
in Iran have been examined by using annual time series data from 1960 to 2002. The 
Johansen multivariate cointegration technique and the Engle-Granger two-step 
procedure are employed to estimate and validate empirically the short- and long-term 
exchange rate models. 
The empirical results are broadly consistent with previous studies and the 
monetary approach to the exchange-rate determination. It is found that in the long- and 
short-term policies aimed at curbing the rate of inflation and stimulating the real growth 
of GDP can restore and strengthen Iranian currency. It seems that relative import price 
changes have not exerted a sizable and significant impact on the black market exchange 
rate in the short run. In sum, if Iran is to continue financing her budget deficit through 
monetisation, inflation can further depreciate the domestic currency on a one-to-one 
basis. Therefore, given the magnitudes of the long-run elasticities for relative prices 
(β1=2.52) and GDP (-0.39), curbing inflation should be the number one priority on the 
policy agenda of the Iranian government and this cannot be achieved unless the central 
bank of Iran operates independently.  
 13 
Table 1. ADF and KPSS Test Results 
(including both constant and trend) 
ADF test 
Variable ADF 
statistics 
Optimum 
lag 
KPSS  
Statistics 
ln(BE) -2.12 0 0.174* 
∆ln(BE) -5.17* 0 0.110 
ln(P/P
*
) -1.69 2 0.217* 
∆ln(P/P*) -4.15* 1 0.101 
Ln(Y) -2.31 1 0.156* 
∆ln(Y) -3.50* 0 0.107 
ln(Pm/P
*
m) -0.51 1 0.223* 
∆ln(Pm/P
*
m) -39.18 0 0.111 
Note: *  indicates that the corresponding null hypothesis 
is rejected at the 5% significance level. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Johansen Test for Cointegration 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Eigenvalue 
Trace 
statistic 
5% 
critical 
value 
Max. 
Eigenvalue 
statistic 
5% 
critical 
value 
None 0.54 60.35* 47.21 31.10* 27.07 
At most 1 0.36 29.25 29.68 18.07 20.97 
At most 2 0.24 11.19 15.41 11.04 14.07 
At most 3 0.00 0.15 3.76 0.15 3.76 
Note: * indicates that the corresponding null hypothesis is rejected at 5 % 
significance level. 
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Table 3. Results for the Short-Term Black Market Exchange Rate model, ∆ln(BEt)  
Independent Variables 
Estimated 
elasticities 
t-statistics* Prob. Expected signs 
Intercept 0.090 1.9 [0.06]  
∆ln(P/P*)t 0.700 2.3 [0.03] + 
∆ln(Yt-1) -0.824 -2.1 [0.05] - 
ECMt-1 -0.196 -1.8 [0.08] - 
Order of integration of stochastic residuals: I(0) 
Goodness-of-fit statistics: 
R
2=0.371              Overall F statistic F=(3,38) =7.5 
Diagnostic tests: 
DW 2.1  
AR 1-2 F (2, 36) = 0.105 [0.90] 
ARCH 1 F (1, 36) = 1.96 [0.17] 
Normality χ2 (2)  =  1.26 [0.53] 
White Heteroskedasticity F (9, 28) = 1.93 [0.09] 
RESET F (1, 37) = 0.13 [0.71] 
Notes: a) Figures in square brackets show the corresponding probabilities; b) the estimation 
method is OLS, the sample period is from 1960 to 2002. 
 
 
 Figure 1. The Relative Consumer Price Indices in Iran (P) and 
the U.S (P*) and the Black Market Exchange Rate (BE), 1960-2003 
-1
0
1
2
3
4
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
P/P* BE
Normalized
data
 
Sources: Tabibian et al. (2000), the Central Bank (2002, 2003) and  
the International Monetary Fund (2004) on-line IFS database.  
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